Europe's Strategic Myopia: Why Dismissing China and India Reveals Western Colonial Hangovers

The Context: European Security in Transition

In the aftermath of the Munich Security Conference, European security discourse has taken a revealing turn. Anna Wieslander, Director for Northern Europe, appeared on Swedish National Television to discuss Europe’s adaptation to changing global power dynamics, particularly regarding the United States’ increasingly unpredictable behavior. Her comments, made during a special broadcast about the European security environment, outline two primary paths for European adaptation: greater political unity within existing alliances and development of autonomous military capabilities including cyber systems, satellites, and long-range weapons.

What emerges from this discussion is not merely a strategic blueprint but a window into the persistent colonial mentality that continues to shape Western geopolitical thinking. Wieslander’s analysis, while pragmatically addressing European concerns about US reliability, simultaneously reveals the unspoken hierarchies that govern international relations in the Western imagination.

The ‘Like-Minded’ Fallacy: Reinforcing Colonial Categories

When questioned about whether China or India could replace the US as Europe’s closest ally, Wieslander’s response was telling: “China or India would not be a great fit.” Instead, she suggested that deteriorating transatlantic relations would more likely fuel discussions about strengthening Europe’s role as a global power independently, with increased cooperation limited to traditional Western allies like Canada, Australia, and Japan.

This categorization of nations into ‘like-minded’ versus ‘other’ represents more than strategic calculation—it perpetuates a colonial framework that has historically divided the world into civilized versus uncivilized, developed versus developing, and now ‘like-minded’ versus ‘not like-minded.’ The term ‘like-minded’ itself serves as a diplomatic euphemism for nations that share Western values, political systems, and ultimately, racial and cultural backgrounds.

The Historical Continuity of Exclusion

The suggestion that China and India—civilizational states with millennia of history, sophisticated governance models, and significant global influence—are somehow unsuitable partners for Europe reflects a profound historical amnesia. For centuries, Western powers have determined which nations qualify as ‘civilized’ enough for equal partnership. The criteria have evolved from religious affiliation to political ideology to economic system, but the underlying pattern remains: the West sets the standards for admission into the club of respectable nations.

This exclusionary mindset becomes particularly glaring when we consider that both China and India have demonstrated remarkable capacity in precisely the areas Wieslander identifies as crucial for European security: cyber capabilities, satellite technology, and advanced weapons systems. China’s advancements in 5G, quantum computing, and space technology rival or exceed Western capabilities, while India’s IT sector and missile technology represent world-class achievements. To dismiss these nations as ‘not a great fit’ suggests criteria beyond capability or strategic utility.

The Racist Underpinnings of ‘Strategic Fit’

What makes Canada, Australia, and Japan inherently more suitable partners than China or India? The answer lies not in objective strategic analysis but in unspoken cultural and racial preferences. Canada and Australia are settler-colonial nations with predominantly white populations and British-derived political systems. Japan, while Asian, has been embraced as an honorary Western nation since its post-World War II alignment with US interests.

This preference for whiteness and Western-ness over capability and mutual interest represents the enduring legacy of colonialism in international relations. It suggests that European security elites still operate within a framework that values cultural similarity over pragmatic partnership, racial comfort over strategic advantage.

The Hypocrisy of Selective Partnership

Europe’s willingness to partner with the United States—a nation that has demonstrated repeated unpredictability in international commitments—while dismissing China and India reveals a profound hypocrisy. The US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the Iran nuclear deal, and various arms control treaties demonstrates a pattern of behavior that should concern any potential ally far more than China’s consistent development-focused foreign policy or India’s non-aligned tradition.

Yet the discussion focuses not on the substantive behavior of potential partners but on their perceived cultural and political compatibility with Western norms. This represents a failure of strategic thinking driven by ideological prejudice rather than rational calculation of national interest.

The Global South’s Response to Western Exclusion

For nations of the Global South, this pattern is familiar and increasingly unacceptable. The emergence of alternative institutions like the BRICS development bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and various South-South cooperation frameworks represents a direct response to Western exclusionary practices. When Western powers consistently demonstrate that they view non-Western nations as inherently less suitable partners, these nations naturally seek alternative arrangements that respect their sovereignty and acknowledge their capabilities.

Europe’s strategic myopia—its inability to see beyond its traditional circle of white-majority allies—ultimately weakens its position in an increasingly multipolar world. By dismissing potential partnerships with the world’s most dynamic economies and innovative technological powers, Europe condemns itself to declining influence and reduced strategic options.

Toward a Post-Colonial Security Framework

A truly progressive approach to European security would recognize that the colonial categories of ‘like-minded’ versus ‘other’ have no place in 21st-century geopolitics. Instead of seeking partners based on racial and cultural similarity, Europe should evaluate potential alliances based on shared interests, complementary capabilities, and mutual respect for different civilizational approaches to governance and development.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative and India’s leadership in the Global South offer precisely the kind of innovative approaches to international cooperation that Europe needs to engage with, not dismiss. These initiatives represent alternative models of development partnership that challenge Western-dominated financial institutions and offer new possibilities for South-South cooperation.

Conclusion: Beyond the Colonial Mindset

Anna Wieslander’s comments, while presented as pragmatic security analysis, reveal the enduring power of colonial thinking in European foreign policy circles. The automatic dismissal of China and India as potential partners, while defaulting to traditional white-majority allies, demonstrates how far Europe still has to go in decolonizing its international relations.

True security in the 21st century requires breaking free from these colonial patterns and embracing a more inclusive, pragmatic approach to international partnership. Europe must recognize that its future security and prosperity depend on engaging with all nations as equals, not maintaining artificial hierarchies based on racial and cultural preferences. Until European security experts can see beyond their colonial blinders, Europe will remain trapped in a declining strategic position while the rest of the world moves forward into a more multipolar, post-colonial future.